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ABSTRACT
In this article, I conduct a contextual analysis of transhumanist conceptions of posthuman 
futures. Focusing on cryonics, nanotechnology, and artificial superintelligence technological 
projects through a study of primarily American sources from the 1960s onward, I identify 
three distinct conceptualizations of the posthuman future: Promethean, spontaneous, and 
scalar. I argue that transhumanists envision posthumanity as resulting from a transition that 
involves both continuity and radical change. Although these three posthuman futures appear 
to share an interest in predicting a superior “cosmic” realization of human destiny, they 
involve distinct “liberal” conceptions of historical agency. These include the unlimited indi-
vidual liberty of the technologized self, the knowledge-ordering properties of the market, and 
the rational aggregation of individual interests over the long term. I locate these heterogeneous 
and partly conflicting conceptions of historical agency in the context of the postwar crisis and 
remaking of liberalism’s future. I argue that transhumanist ideas about the transition toward a 
more-than-human or beyond-human future are best understood as manifesting a wide range 
of attempts at thinking about horizons of unprecedented change within the terms of postwar 
liberal projects. Ultimately, transhumanist futures shed light on the multiplicity of political 
temporalities that are required for thinking and writing stories about unprecedented futures. 
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The Singularity may be counterintuitive to you, but you grew up in Real Life, where the 
Laws are constant and things change over decades. To me, Transcension is homey and 
familiar, the logical conclusion of one of the realities I grew up in. 
— Eliezer S. Yudkowsky, “Singularity: Generation Gap”2
“Nothing is quite so dead today as the spirit of optimism that the very word 
Enlightenment evokes.”3 Thus the philosopher Judith N. Shklar introduced her 
1. Open Access funding enabled and organized by ProjektDEAL.
2. Eliezer S. Yudkowsky, “Singularity: Generation Gap,” Extropians, 24 September 1997, 
accessed 25 February 2021, http://extropians.weidai.com/extropians.3Q97/4352.html.
3. Judith N. Shklar, After Utopia: The Decline of Political Faith (1957; repr. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2020), 3._____________________
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1957 book, After Utopia: The Decline of Political Faith. The book was not a 
critique of utopianism but a rather gloomy examination of the postwar ideologi-
cal landscape, which Shklar understood as having been marked by the erosion of 
socialist and liberal projects and the domination of romantic fatalism. For Shklar, 
the end of liberal faith did not condemn political imagination as irrelevant but 
emphasized the importance of distinguishing between useful hope and unrealistic 
utopia, a distinction that she took to be of practical concern for all political philos-
ophies.4 In a later essay, Shklar noted that American author Nathaniel Hawthorne, 
whom she believed was a key reformist thinker, reminded readers that, “however 
utopian a community thinks itself, it still must begin by building a prison and a 
graveyard.”5 For Hawthorne, and it seems for Shklar as well, reformism required 
a balanced view of history, one that acknowledged the excesses not only of utopia 
but also of tradition in the past (and likely in the future as well). No reformist 
project could escape the bounds of human nature. 
As Samuel Moyn has pointed out in his foreword to the latest edition of 
After Utopia, “it turns out that ‘after utopia’ is a familiar place in which to find 
ourselves.”6 The current moment and the postwar years share not only a sense 
of ideological exhaustion but also the feeling that political theory has reached an 
impasse. Recent historiography and political theory have widely discussed this 
sentiment that possible futures have eroded. The concept of the Anthropocene in 
particular seems to suggest a dramatic and unprecedented extension of historicity 
into deep and nonhuman pasts and futures.7 Zoltán Boldizsár Simon and Marek 
Tamm have proposed that the current predicament expresses a new Western 
historical sensibility, manifest in the emergence of previously unimaginable 
futures.8 This emerging historical sensibility, they have argued, is evident in con-
temporary transhumanist ideas about a future posthumanity: posthuman futures 
are “disconnective” in the sense that they no longer relate present experiences and 
future prospects to past forms of intelligibility.9 
This article discusses ideas about the posthuman future within Anglophone 
transhumanism in the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries through the prism 
of their conceptualizations of change and continuity. From the 1960s onward, 
and primarily in the United States and Western Europe, transhumanists have 
envisioned a future without graveyards, and sometimes without prisons. Yet most 
4. Recent interest in Shklar’s work has extended beyond her alleged theorizing of dystopic liberal-
ism. See especially Katrina Forrester, “Hope and Memory in the Thought of Judith Shklar,” Modern 
Intellectual History 8, no. 3 (2011), 591-620. 
5. Judith N. Shklar, “An Education for America: Tocqueville, Hawthorne, Emerson,” in 
Redeeming American Political Thought, ed. Stanley Hoffmann and Dennis F. Thompson (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998), 72, quoted in Forrester, “Hope and Memory in the Thought of 
Judith Shklar,” 603.
6. Samuel Moyn, foreword to Shklar, After Utopia, xv.
7. Among a vast literature, see Christophe Bonneuil and Jean-Baptiste Fressoz, The Shock of 
the Anthropocene (London: Verso, 2016); Donna J. Haraway, Staying with the Trouble: Making 
Kin in the Chthulucene (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016); Duncan Kelly, Politics and the 
Anthropocene (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2019).
8. Zoltán Boldizsár Simon and Marek Tamm, “Historical Futures,” History and Theory 60, no. 1 
(2021), 3-22. 
9. Simon and Tamm, “Historical Futures,” 7. See also Zoltán Boldizsár Simon, History in Times 
of Unprecedented Change: A Theory for the 21st Century (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019).
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of the time they would not call their project utopian. Transhumanists advocate the 
possibility and desirability of posthumanity: they claim that fundamental changes 
in human biology and society will be brought about not only through education 
and scientific knowledge but also by more controversial methods of chemical 
or genetic manipulation, human-machine hybridization, and the development of 
superintelligent machines. According to Nick Bostrom, “transhumanists hope 
that by responsible use of science, technology, and other rational means we shall 
eventually manage to become posthuman, beings with vastly greater capacities 
than present human beings have.”10 In this sense, “transhumanism has roots in 
secular humanist thinking, yet is more radical” in its attempts “to overcome some 
of our basic biological limits,” such as mortality or aging.11 
The now-burgeoning literature on transhumanism sheds light on the wide range 
of transhumanist projects, which (in their own terms) involve more-than-human 
and posthuman futures, visions of radical change and technological forecasting, 
projects about individual survival, and claims of global emancipation.12 Scholars 
in the fields of critical theory, literary theory, and geography have contrasted the 
posthuman’s emancipatory potential as a critical tool for undermining the per-
ceived universality and homogeneity of the category of human, which is in fact a 
historically situated, gendered, and racialized notion, with what they understand 
as transhumanism’s reductionist and literal approach to posthumanity.13 From 
these perspectives, transhumanism is best understood as a form of “technoliberal-
ism” that exacerbates contemporary dynamics of control, discipline, and extrac-
tion.14 At the same time, scholars in science and technology studies and religious 
studies have discussed how transhumanism hybridizes conventional conceptions 
of the utopian, the religious, and the secular in a characteristically postmodern 
way.15 Transhumanism, in this sense, expresses “the Zeitgeist of our technologi-
cal age.”16 It is also noteworthy that most transhumanists have understood their 
10. Nick Bostrom, “Transhumanist Values,” in “Ethical Issues for the Twenty-First Century,” 
supplement, Journal of Philosophical Research 30 (2005), 4.
11. Ibid.
12. Scholarship on transhumanism includes Post- and Transhumanism: An Introduction, ed. 
Robert Ranisch and Stefan Lorenz Sorgner (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2014); Perfecting Human 
Futures: Transhuman Visions and Technological Imaginations, ed. J. Benjamin Hurlbut and Hava 
Tirosh-Samuelson (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2016); Gilbert Hottois, Philosophie et idéologies trans/
posthumanistes (Paris: Vrin, 2017); Benjamin Bourcier, “Les théories politiques du transhumanisme,” 
Raisons politiques 74, no. 2 (2019), 5-12.
13. See, for example, Neil Badmington, “Theorizing Posthumanism,” Cultural Critique 53, no. 1 
(2003), 10-27; Cary Wolfe, What Is Posthumanism? (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2009), xiii-xv; Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2013). For a reflection 
on the relationship between transhumanism and posthumanism, see Zoltán Boldizsár Simon, “Two 
Cultures of the Posthuman Futures,” History and Theory 58, no. 2 (2019), 171-84.
14. Rosi Braidotti, “A Theoretical Framework for the Critical Posthumanities,” Theory, Culture 
& Society 35, no. 6 (2019), 48. On the notion of technoliberalism, see Neda Atanasoski and Kalindi 
Vora, Surrogate Humanity: Race, Robots, and the Politics of Technological Futures (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2019), 4, 13.
15. See especially Nasser Zakariya, “Scientific Humanisms and Technological Utopias: Situating 
the Transhumanist Imagination,” in Hurlbut and Tirosh-Samuelson, Perfecting Human Futures, 286. 
See also Syed Mustafa Ali, “‘White Crisis’ and/as ‘Existential Risk,’ or the Entangled Apocalypticism 
of Artificial Intelligence,” Zygon 54, no. 1 (2019), 207-24.
16. Hava Tirosh-Samuelson, “In Pursuit of Perfection: The Misguided Transhumanist Vision,” 
Theology and Science 16, no. 2 (2018), 204. 
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project as either fundamentally antipolitical or theoretically compatible with a 
wide variety of political stances.17 
In this article, I define transhumanism as a space of discourse and technological 
practices that entail the projection and advocacy of posthuman futures. I argue that 
transhumanist ideas of transition toward a more-than-human or beyond-human 
future are best understood as manifesting the wide range of postwar liberal proj-
ects, including distinct possibilities for thinking about horizons of unprecedented 
change. I conduct a contextual analysis of self-defined transhumanist conceptions 
of change, focusing primarily on American transhumanist writings published 
between the 1960s and the present. I discuss how transhumanists have understood 
horizons of unprecedented change as holding onto a strong and reassuring con-
nection between the present and the future, and I show how they have done so by 
making intersecting claims about unknowability and forms of anticipatory knowl-
edge. In other words, this article discusses the various ways in which posthuman 
futures have been crafted as both connective and disconnective. I leave aside the 
theoretical question of whether stories about posthuman futures signal an actual 
change in the regime of historicity or whether they should be understood as the 
outburst of a now-obsolete mode of experiencing time.18 At various points in this 
article, however, I examine the sort of history that such visions of the future have 
entailed for transhumanists themselves. In this way, I contribute to the political 
history and ideological analysis of contemporary visions of epochal change. 
In the first section, I introduce three conceptualizations of the posthuman 
future, each of which is tied to a specific technological project: the Promethean 
future of cryonics, the spontaneous future of nanotechnology, and the scalar 
future of superintelligence. In the second section, I explain how these concep-
tualizations are meant to ensure continuity in times of radical change. The third 
section discusses the various ways in which transhumanists have attempted to 
anticipate a superior “cosmic” realization—a posthuman future partly beyond 
grasp, yet foretold in various ways. I claim in the fourth section that transhu-
manism also involves highly heterogeneous political ideas about unprecedented 
change that are best understood in light of the postwar crisis and remaking of 
liberal conceptions of the future. Transhumanist futures, I conclude, shed light 
on the multiplicity of political temporalities that are required for thinking and 
writing stories about unprecedented futures.
THREE STORIES OF THE POSTHUMAN FUTURE
The Promethean Future of Cryonics
Under the category of “Promethean future,” I gather transhumanist discourse that 
values individual choice, exploration of the self, and personal immortality. This 
17. For an overview, see Tamar Sharon, Human Nature in an Age of Biotechnology: The Case for 
Mediated Posthumanism (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2014), 17-56.
18. On this topic, see Helge Jordheim, “Introduction: Multiple Times and the Work of 
Synchronization,” History and Theory 53, no. 4 (2014), 498-518; Rethinking Historical Time: New 
Approaches to Presentism, ed. Marek Tamm and Laurent Olivier (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 
2019); Simon, History in Times of Unprecedented Change.
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is particularly true for the field of cryonics, which was inspired by mid-twentieth 
century cryobiology and science fiction. Cryonics entails a set of techniques for 
conserving and preserving the dead; the goal is that most of the damage that 
currently appears irreparable will be able to be healed in the future.19 Although 
cryonicists have not always gotten along, they have generally agreed that the idea 
of physical immortality is “the most profound and powerful idea in history.”20 
According to cryonicist Robert C. W. Ettinger, the possibility of successfully 
reanimating humans after cryonic suspension would create “a discontinuity in 
history, with mortality and humanity on one side—on the other immortality and 
transhumanity.”21 At the same time, for Ettinger, cryonics promised “a bridge to an 
anticipated Golden Age” and “strengthened feeling of the unity of mankind.”22 As 
cryonicists have insisted, such attempts to revive the dead were not new, and they 
were susceptible to changes in social norms of well-being and biological knowl-
edge.23 “Suspended death,” in Ettinger’s terms, would be merely one among many 
other existing and potential longevity technologies that seek to conserve life and 
extend it into a hitherto inaccessible, but nonetheless fathomable, realm of time.24 
In the 1960s, scenarios of cryonics resuscitation typically entailed a qualitative, 
categorical leap into a potentially remote future, when techniques for securing 
immortality would not only be available but would also ensure that some form of 
personal identity could be maintained in the process. In other words, these sce-
narios often implied that the future would be at once very different from and quite 
similar to the present (at least from the viewpoint of the cryopreserved individual), 
for otherwise the prospect of immortality would be too frightening. 
Two decades later, cryonics remained an extremely marginal practice: to 
cryonicists’ dismay, many were called, but few were frozen.25 In the 1980s and 
1990s, cryonics also illustrated the integration of transhumanism within liber-
tarianism, as cryonicists increasingly justified their unique views by referring 
to the novels and objectivist philosophy of Russian émigré novelist Ayn Rand. 
According to cryonicists, the choice to be cryonically preserved was rooted in 
rational selfishness. As the president of a cryonics organization explained, “it has 
19. On cryonics, see Grant Shoffstall, “Freeze, Wait, Reanimate: Cryonic Suspension and Science 
Fiction,” Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 30, no. 4 (2010), 285-97; Tiffany Romain, 
“Extreme Life Extension: Investing in Cryonics for the Long, Long Term,” Medical Anthropology 
29, no. 2 (2010), 194-215; Jonny Bunning, “The Freezer Program: Value after Life,” in Cryopolitics: 
Frozen Life in a Melting World, ed. Joanna Radin and Emma Kowal (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2017), 215-43.
20. Saul Kent, “The First Cryonicist,” Cryonics 32 (March 1983), 10. See also Michael Darwin, 
“Reflections on the Birth of Cryonics in Britain,” Cryonics 7, no. 11 (1986), 22-25.
21. Robert C. W. Ettinger, “The Transhuman Condition,” Man into Superman  (Clinton, MI: 
Cryonics Institute, 1989), 5.
22. Robert C. W. Ettinger, The Prospect of Immortality (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964), 
82, 159.
23. Gerald J. Gruman, “A History of Ideas about the Prolongation of Life: The Evolution of 
Prolongevity Hypotheses to 1800,” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 56, no. 9 
(1966), 1-102.
24. Ettinger, The Prospect of Immortality, 36. 
25. This reference to the biblical verse “For many are called, but few are chosen” (Matthew 22:14) 
appeared frequently in cryonics writings. It was commonly used to express the unpopularity of cryon-
ics or the heroic disposition of cryonicists. 
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been said that space is the final frontier. It is not. Expanding our own futures, 
extending our own lives, that is the final frontier and the only truly endless one. 
Cryonicists do not intend to shrink from that frontier. That is the true mark of 
a pioneer.”26 For Max More, a committed cryonicist and self-described “trans-
humanist philosopher,” the individual quest for physical transformation was 
not a sin against nature but a humanizing transgression. This very transgression 
was now required from those with superior judgment, and this meant endorsing 
cryonics. As More envisioned it, a vanguard of selfish individuals would change 
the course of evolution by endorsing not only life extension techniques such as 
cryonics but also other self-transformation technologies that would eventually 
turn them into other-than-human beings in the biological sense. 
Although cryonics ideas and practices have changed between the 1960s and 
today, many cryonicists across this period have subscribed to an understanding 
of organic progress that emphasizes advancement from lower to higher levels 
of complexity. Ettinger, for instance, claimed that humanity’s current stage was 
“only a rung on the evolutionary ladder.”27 In More’s view as well, humanity is 
best defined by its “drive towards complexity” and the overcoming of bodily, 
mental, and environmental limitations.28 Cryonicists have described their belief 
in this particular form of human evolution as grounded in humanist ideals and 
the notion that humans can master their biological natures and environment 
through intellectual achievement. But in the technological context of the late 
twentieth century, they also argued that “humanism, while a step in the right 
direction, contains too many outdated values and ideas,”29 including the notion 
that progress should (or could) be confined to “the merely human stage of 
evolution.”30 In particular, Max More emphasized the importance of individual 
choice in matters of “morphological, neurological, and genetic freedom,” argu-
ing that technology was the most promising means for overcoming the innate 
irrationality and violence in human nature.31 According to More, transhumanists 
were “the torch-bearers of Nietzsche’s radical program of reassessment and 
self-constitution” because they had reclaimed the right to change themselves 
at will.32 Through what he called “self-transformation,” transhumanists would 
overcome a flaw of the “übermenschean ideal”: humanity could not risk losing 
what Nietzsche had called the “will to power” because of uncontrollable evo-
lutionary forces.33 This meant that biological evolution was a process that had 
to be tamed. As More wrote, “the ability to question everything, to hold up to 
the bright light of reason every supposition, assumption, and dogma, requires 
more than just the will to do so. We also require intelligent technology to assist 
26. Michael Darwin, “The Omni Affair,” Cryonics 7, no. 11 (1986), 9 (emphasis added).
27. Ettinger, The Prospect of Immortality, 74.
28. Max More, “On Becoming Posthuman,” Free Inquiry 15, no. 4 (1994).
29. Max More, “Transhumanism: Towards a Futurist Philosophy,” Extropy 6 (Summer 1990), 6.
30. Max More, “The Extropian Principles 2.5,” Aleph (blog), July 1993, http://www.aleph.se/
Trans/Cultural/Philosophy/princip.html.
31. Max More, “Technological Self-Transformation: Expanding Personal Extropy,” Extropy 4, 
no. 2 (1993), 17.
32. Max More, “Editorial,” Extropy 6, no. 1 (1994), 4.
33. More, “Editorial,” 4; More, “Technological Self-Transformation,” 15.
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us in this Promethean task.”34 Humans would be able to overcome death—they 
would, in other words, be able to eliminate the tragic from human existence by 
making choices in the present. This captures the Promethean future of cryonics: 
by contesting the ultimate unquestionability of death, transhumanists (in their 
“posthuman” descent) would not be gods but rather humans who have broken 
free from their illusions and bodies, both of which being understood as funda-
mental limitations that cannot be overcome without first doing away with the 
“disease” of humanity altogether.35
The Spontaneous Future of Nanotechnology
The term “spontaneous future” denotes those instances of transhumanist dis-
course that have insisted on not only the self-ordering dynamics of technologi-
cal and social change but also the value of an open future. Especially relevant 
in this respect is the notion of nanotechnology developed by K. Eric Drexler. 
A space and cryonics activist, Drexler helped popularize the concept of nano-
technology through his 1986 book titled Engines of Creation, which he wrote 
while working as a graduate student of Marvin Minsky at the MIT Media Lab.36 
Drexler described nanotechnology as an engineering method that was based on 
the manipulation of atoms and that would one day enable humanity to create 
inalterable objects and materials. Nanotechnology, in his view, would enable 
material abundance as well as potentially unlimited biological regeneration, 
which would be necessary for cryonic reanimation. Drexler claimed that the 
emergence of molecular engineering was an “almost inevitable” and “massive 
breakthrough,” but he also noted that it was compatible with the laws of physics 
and the “deep-rooted principles of evolutionary change.”37 Future nanotechnol-
ogy, he explained, would arise not from unpredictable scientific revolutions but 
from the convergence of various areas of technological progress. The changes 
resulting from this convergence would, in turn, subtly alter the world system’s 
equilibrium, leading to positive-sum games and global cooperation.38 For Drex-
ler, scientific progress occured through an undirected, polycentric process, an 
idea he borrowed from Karl Popper, Michael Polanyi, and Friedrich A. Hayek.39 
In this view, future drastic changes would result from the cumulative effects of 
projects conducted independently according to a shared set of principles. For 
instance, in order to limit the proliferation of self-replicating nanoscale robots, 
the machines of the future could be engineered as “law-abiding citizens,” a term 
34. More, “Editorial,” 4.
35. The idea of humanity as disease is developed especially in Ettinger, “The Deficiencies of 
Natural Man,” Man into Superman, 15-23.  
36. K. Eric Drexler, Engines of Creation (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1986). 
See also Stewart Brand, The Media Lab: Inventing the Future at MIT (New York: Penguin Books, 
1988), 226. On nanotechnology, see Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent, “Nanobots and Nanotubes: Two 
Alternative Biomimetic Paradigms of Nanotechnology,” in Genesis Redux: Essays in the History and 
Philosophy of Artificial Life, ed. Jessica Riskin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 221-36. 
37. Drexler, Engines of Creation, 20, 38. 
38. Ibid, 83, 199.
39. See especially Mark S. Miller and K. Eric Drexler, “Markets and Computation: Agoric Open 
Systems,” in The Ecology of Computation, ed. B. A. Huberman (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1988), 
133-76.
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meant to suggest that they would be as subject to the defining features of their 
design as they would be to the inalterable laws of physics.40 
Drexler was what W. Patrick McCray has termed a “visioneer,” an engineer of 
the Cold War years who opened horizons of ideological change through concrete 
technological practice.41 According to McCray, advocating nanotechnology or 
space colonization was meant to refute the neo-Malthusian concerns that were 
pervasive during the 1970s. Nanotechnology would grow “the size of the future’s 
promise” by fostering the material and ideological conditions needed to secure 
a future of unlimited “free space.”42 As Drexler explained, this “open” future 
would be fueled by the classical liberal economic idea that had also powered the 
Industrial Revolution: “that wealth springs from ideas, investment, production, 
and trade.”43 The posthuman future would be a liberal utopia in the sense that it 
would be a plural world, one with enough resources for all individuals to fulfill 
their life plans in satisfactory ways and without making anyone else worse off. 
This vision coalesced in a future state of the world that Drexler and others termed 
Paretotopia.44 The notion of Paretotopia highlights the value of free choice, yet at 
the same time it points to a single reference point for optimizing individual mate-
rial endowment and preferences.
Realizing the nanotechnology of the future, in Drexler’s view, would require 
not only federal support but also a rational politics of knowledge. Instructed by 
space activism’s failure to generate widespread political support, Drexler and other 
advocates of nanotechnology did not hope that technological progress would occur 
on its own. Instead, they claimed that it should be cultivated by society. This belief 
was not merely hollow rhetoric; rather, it represented a strong epistemological 
thesis that the rationality of decentralized knowledge was superior to that of cen-
tral planning. Such rational knowledge institutions included the “science court,” a 
courtlike procedure through which scientists would settle scientific controversies 
in order to provide sound empirical grounds for policymaking.45 Another was the 
project of hypertext publishing, an indexing method that would enable the effi-
cient sharing of information on computer networks.46 Away from the cumbersome 
bureaucracy of government-controlled science, new knowledge environments 
40. Drexler, Engines of Creation, 173. See also ibid., 147-57, 222.
41. W. Patrick McCray, The Visioneers: How a Group of Elite Scientists Pursued Space Colonies, 
Nanotechnologies, and a Limitless Future (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).
42. K. Eric Drexler, “A Technology of Tiny Things: Nanotechnics and Civilization,” Whole Earth 
Review 54 (Spring 1987), 12.
43. Ibid., 12-13.
44. The term “Paretotopia,” although never formalized, was used by Drexler, Miller, and others 
from the 1980s onward. See K. Eric Drexler, “Reframing Superintelligence: Comprehensive AI 
Services as General Intelligence” (Technical Report #2019-1, Future of Humanity Institute, University 
of Oxford, 2019), 130, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Reframing_Superintelligence_
FHI-TR-2019-1.1-1.pdf.
45. Task Force of the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in Science and 
Technology, “The Science Court Experiment: An Interim Report,” Science 193 (August 1976), 
653-56. For contextualization and critique, see Dorothy Nelkin, “Thoughts on the Proposed Science 
Court,” Newsletter on Science, Technology & Human Values 2, no. 1 (1977), 20-31.
46. Theodor H. Nelson, Computer Lib/Dream Machines, 2nd ed. (Redmond, WA: Tempus Books 
of Microsoft Press, 1987); K. Eric Drexler, “Hypertext Publishing and the Evolution of Knowledge,” 
Social Intelligence 1, no. 2 (1991), 87-120.
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would favor the “memes” of reason; scientific publics and communities could 
develop an “orderly way to bring about the facts.”47 In such spaces, new knowl-
edge authorities would emerge in a decentralized fashion from the aggregation of 
manifold private exchanges. For instance, with hypertext and personal computers, 
individuals would be able to retrieve the whole knowledge “record of the race” 
according to their specific needs.48 As Drexler and other “high-tech Hayekians” 
claimed, technoscientific progress would be realized through the most efficient 
social technology available for exchanging and ordering knowledge: a spontane-
ous market.49 Just like in Hayek’s conception of the market, however, this process 
would occur on the background of a continuity in culture and tradition. In the 
spontaneous future of nanotechnology, technoscientific progress—and thus the 
preservation of free choice—would depend on the emergence, transmission, and 
cultivation of scientific truth through self-ordering mechanisms.
The Scalar Future of Superintelligence
The “scalar future” encompasses ideas within literary and engineering writings 
produced between the 1980s and the present about future change involving the 
extension of present economic and moral value over large scales of space and 
time. The core idea of singularity, which was introduced by science fiction writer 
and computer scientist Vernor Vinge in 1987 and popularized by engineer Ray 
Kurzweil, is that trends of growth in computer capacity will continue to acceler-
ate in the near future.50 This would ultimately trigger an “intellectual runaway,” 
an exponential growth in artificial intelligence (AI) leading to the development of 
superhuman intelligent machines capable of self-improvement, thereby causing 
unprecedented technological and social disruption.51 According to singularity theo-
rists, unprecedented and uncontrollable changes would lead to a point in history so 
different that all social norms would become obsolete. As Vinge explained, “when 
a race succeeds in making creatures that are smarter than it is, then all the rules are 
changed. And from the standpoint of that race, you’ve gone through a Singular-
ity,” by which he meant the obsolescence of current normative standards.52 For this 
reason, Vinge claimed that adopting a strategy of “Drexlerian confinement” would 
not sufficiently contain the proliferation and power of self-improving machines.53 
Throughout the 2000s and 2010s, prolific transhumanist writers such as Bostrom 
47. Drexler, Engines of Creation, 35, 208. The notion of a meme refers to small and easily repli-
cable bits of information. See Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006).
48. I borrow the phrase “record of the race” from Vannevar Bush’s description of the memex, 
which was a key inspiration for hypertext programmers in the late 1980s, even though their projects 
differed considerably. See Vannevar Bush, “As We May Think,” The Atlantic, July 1945, https://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1945/07/as-we-may-think/303881/.
49. Don Lavoie, Howard Baetjer, and William Tulloh, “High-Tech Hayekians: Some Possible 
Research Topics in the Economics of Computation,” Market Process 8 (1990), 120-46.
50. Vernor Vinge, True Names . . . and Other Dangers (New York: Baen Books, 1987); Ray 
Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology (New York: Viking, 2005).
51. Vernor Vinge, “The Technological Singularity” (presentation, Vision 21: Interdisciplinary 
Science and Engineering in the Era of Cyberspace, NASA Lewis Research Center, 1993), 14, https://
ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19940022855.
52. Vernor Vinge, “Hurtling towards the Singularity,” interview by Michael Synergy, Mondo 2000 
7 (Fall 1989), 116 (emphasis added).
53. Vinge, “The Technological Singularity,” 16.
APOLLINE TAILLANDIER224
and Eliezer Yudkowsky rejected the notion that a singularity event would neces-
sarily be predictable.54 In particular, Bostrom emphasized the value of mitigating 
potential “existential risks” resulting from future developments in nanotechnology 
or AI.55 He argued that the technological disruption of existing social orders could 
and should be averted instead of passively embraced. In this view, the future of AI 
would not result from inescapable acceleration: reaching the preferred goal would 
require determining what constituted the possible features of a future world state 
and the possible pathways to realize it, and this could be done through the devel-
opment of future AI scenarios. Judging which scenario is best and how to achieve 
it would require new forms of expertise about the moral features of AI systems as 
well as new frameworks for aggregating the preferences of all those affected by 
automated decisions—including all present and future beings.56 
In recent years, problems of AI “control” and “safety” have raised concern 
and attention that extend well beyond the field of transhumanism.57 In part, 
however, how AI researchers have defined such problems relates to transhuman-
ist debates about the nature of the transition to a future era of machine intel-
ligence.58 These debates have occurred between advocates of continuist (slow 
takeoff) and discontinuist (fast takeoff) singularity hypotheses.59 Whereas the 
slow takeoff hypothesis suggests that AI will cause processual change in the 
world, the fast takeoff scenario predicts the advent of a transformative event. 
In the former case, forms of human adaptation to change would likely occur; in 
the latter, the possibility of adaptation would be drastically limited. Supporters 
of the slow takeoff hypothesis have stated that AI would induce momentous but 
gradual changes that would be similar to the agricultural and industrial revolu-
tions but on a larger scale. The fast takeoff hypothesis’s defenders, including 
Yudkowsky and Bostrom, have implied that a machine “intelligence explosion” 
could occur instantaneously once AI systems have become more “generally” 
intelligent than their human designers.60 As Bostrom has explained, this scenario 
is especially worrying because of the “orthogonality” of cognitive and moral 
capacity: if AI systems displayed superhuman levels of intelligence, they could 
54. Nick Bostrom, “How Long before Superintelligence?” updated 28 August 2000, https://web.
archive.org/web/20001210012600/https://www.nickbostrom.com/superintelligence.html; Eliezer 
Yudkowsky, “Three Major Singularity Schools,” Machine Intelligence Research Institute, 30 
September 2007, https://intelligence.org/2007/09/30/three-major-singularity-schools/.
55. Nick Bostrom, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related 
Hazards,” Journal of Evolution and Technology 9, no. 1 (2002).
56. Eliezer Yudkowsky, Coherent Extrapolated Volution (San Francisco: Singularity Institute, 
2004); Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 141, 212.
57. Stuart J. Russell, Human Compatible: Artificial Intelligence and the Problem of Control (New 
York: Viking, 2019); Sergey Brin, “2017 Founders’ Letter,” Alphabet, 2017, https://abc.xyz/investor/
founders-letters/2017/index.html.
58. See, for instance, Dario Amodei, Chris Olah, Jacob Steinhardt, Paul Christiano, John 
Schulman, and Dan Mané, “Concrete Problems in AI Safety” (arXiv, uploaded 21 June 2016), https://
arxiv.org/abs/1606.06565v1.
59. Robin Hanson and Eliezer Yudkowsky, The Hanson-Yudkowsky AI-Foom Debate (Berkeley: 
Machine Intelligence Research Institute, 2013). For a discussion of both scenarios, see Murray 
Shanahan, The Technological Singularity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015).
60. Bostrom, Superintelligence, 62-77. The notion of artificial general intelligence suggests the 
possibility of future AI systems demonstrating a breadth of cognitive capacities similar to those of 
humans. 
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also cause human extinction for strictly evolutionary reasons.61 Superintelligent 
machines would not care about continuing the existence of the human species 
unless they were explicitly taught to do so. 
According to Bostrom and Yudkowsky, superintelligent AI promises to change 
humanity’s destiny in unprecedented ways, yet this future would need to be 
actively shaped rather than passively anticipated. A key notion in this respect 
is that risk preparedness requires unprecedented forms of human and social 
engineering. For instance, Bostrom has suggested cognitive enhancement as one 
way to maximize the likelihood of an AI transition occurring at a manageable 
(that is, secure) pace.62 As is rarely noted, the apparently radical visions of Vinge 
and Kurzweil also entail elements of continuity: intellectual property rights for 
the former, some form of morality for the latter. In Vinge’s words, “the post-
Singularity world does fit with the larger tradition of change and cooperation that 
started long ago (perhaps even before the rise of biological life)”; this means that 
“much of what we value (knowledge, memory, thought) need never be lost.”63 
As Bostrom and a group of AI policy experts have argued, avoiding a disruptive 
AI scenario would require specific forms of global political regulation, such as 
averting the threat of a technology race between competing nation-states.64 Thus, 
although AI promises to make an unprecedented kind of change in human his-
tory, it also imbues the posthuman horizon with what I have elsewhere referred 
to as a conservative inclination; indeed, long-term dangers posed by AI seem to 
justify urgent calls for risk mitigation that link the preservation of existing global 
orders with the furthering of humane values.65 Safeguarding the future of innova-
tion is a matter of changing the aims of AI from a scientific discipline concerned 
with problem-solving, efficiency, and accuracy “to a field concerned with sys-
tems that are provably beneficial for humans.”66 From this perspective, the scalar 
future of superintelligence opens up new realms of value and unprecedented pos-
sibilities for global coordination, the exploration of which would be essential for 
safely developing posthuman AI.
PATHWAYS TO UNPRECEDENTED CHANGE
As scholars have aptly noted, transhumanist futures profoundly challenge human-
ity’s role as the central subject of history; at the same time, they do not appear 
61. Bostrom, Superintelligence, 107. See also Stephen M. Omohundro, “The Basic AI Drives,” 
Artificial General Intelligence 2008: Proceedings of the First AGI Conference, ed. Pei Wang, Ben 
Goertzel, and Stan Franklin (Amsterdam: ISO Press, 2008), 483-92.
62. Bostrom, Superintelligence, 36.
63. Vinge, “The Technological Singularity,” 20.
64. For a critique of technology races, see Stuart Armstrong, Nick Bostrom, and Carl Shulman, 
“Racing to the Precipice: A Model of Artificial Intelligence Development,” AI & Society 31, no. 2 
(2016), 201-6; Allan Dafoe, “AI Governance: A Research Agenda” (Centre for the Governance of 
AI, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, 27 August 2018), https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/
wp-content/uploads/GovAI-Agenda.pdf.
65. Apolline Taillandier, “From Boundless Expansion to Existential Threat: Transhumanists 
and Posthuman Imaginaries,” in Futures, ed. Sandra Kemp and Jenny Andersson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2021), 333-48.
66. Stuart Russell, “Provably Beneficial Artificial Intelligence,” in The Next Step: Exponential Life 
(Bilbao: OpenMind, 2017), 191.
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to destabilize Western modern history’s universalizing ambitions.67 Simon has 
claimed that narratives of developmental continuity leading from humanity to 
posthumanity must be avoided. The challenge of making sense of the unprec-
edented is retaining the emancipatory potential of Enlightenment horizons of 
collective betterment and the critical power of postcolonial and feminist perspec-
tives. In this sense, transhumanism finds itself at odds with “a global approach 
to politics without the myth of a global identity,” such as that which has been 
promoted by Dipesh Chakrabarty.68 At the same time, transhumanism turns 
technology into the main agent of change. By presenting “a better-than-human 
being that is also other-than-human,” transhumanist technological projects enact 
a vision of posthumanity as “humanity’s temporal other” that undermines the 
modern Western idea of history.69 In this respect, transhumanism is best under-
stood as part of a specific historical moment, one marked by the rise of an evental 
sense of historicity. 
As this article demonstrates, however, transhumanism is also a highly ambigu-
ous idea—at least, it is in terms of how its advocates have defined it. For instance, 
Bostrom has described transhumanism as a gradual process of awakening to 
new realms of experience and value. Defined in this way, transhumanism aims 
to update progressive hopes in the light of new technological possibilities.70 
According to Bostrom, technologies of “human enhancement” are the contem-
porary forms of a modern “quest to develop further.”71 Yet many transhumanists 
have argued that Western values of human improvement failed to be truly uni-
versal. For instance, transhumanist futurist F. M. Esfandiary harshly criticized the 
romanticization of suffering and nature as a flawed intellectual posture that often 
constitutes a disguised form of orientalism, or what he called the “doomsday chic 
of Western intellectuals.”72 To point out precisely how it is that transhumanist 
stories have only partly overcome universalist human history, it is necessary to 
examine the forms of knowledge and identity that would survive the transition 
to some unknown future. Transhumanists understand the human condition as a 
transitional stage, so they believe that some of its qualities are meant to be per-
manently overcome whereas others need to be carefully preserved. 
These three conceptualizations of the posthuman future—the Promethean, 
the spontaneous, and the scalar—illustrate how transhumanist futures intertwine 
notions of utopia, dystopia, progress, and radical change in different ways. The 
posthuman is not conceived of as an entirely new era, even if realizing immortal-
ity and superintelligence would fundamentally alter the course of human history. 
67. See, for example, Hava Tirosh-Samuelson and J. Benjamin Hurlbut, “Introduction: 
Technology, Utopianism and Eschatology,” in Hurlbut and Tirosh-Samuelson, Perfecting Human 
Futures, 1-32; Zoltán Boldizsár Simon, “The Story of Humanity and the Challenge of Posthumanity,” 
History of the Human Sciences 32, no. 2 (2019), 101-20. 
68. Dipesh Chakrabarty, “The Climate of History: Four Theses,” Critical Inquiry 35, no. 2 (2009), 
222.
69. Simon, “The Story of Humanity and the Challenge of Posthumanity,” 112, 113.
70. Bostrom described this process as exiting the “Platonic cave,” where “our cognitive limitations 
may be confining us” (“Transhumanist Values,” 6). 
71. Nick Bostrom, “Human Genetic Enhancements: A Transhumanist Perspective,” Journal of 
Value Inquiry 37, no. 4 (2003), 497, 496.
72. F. M. Esfandiary, Optimism One, 2nd ed. (Robbinsdale, MN: Fawcett Books, 1978), 11.
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Rather, as Bostrom has argued, transhumanism represents the way toward a realm 
of reality, experience, scientific knowledge, and morality that is not yet acces-
sible to humans.73 In this sense, transhumanism is best understood as involving 
both continuous and discontinuous modes of historicity: the posthuman future is 
at once an unprecedented future and a development from past and present pat-
terns of practices, values, and ideas. This point is evidenced by the three types 
of posthuman futures outlined above. In the Promethean future, unprecedented 
change would be brought about by an enlightened vanguard of individuals who 
are dedicated to expanding human capacities through self-transforming tech-
nologies, ranging from bodybuilding to psychoactive drugs. Continuity would 
be ensured by conserving personal identity, which is variously located in genetic 
material or in patterns of neuronal activity. In the spontaneous future, change 
would occur through the uncontrolled emergence of new life forms. However, 
decentralized social institutions would be sustained by shared norms of rational-
ity and the continuous evolution of scientific public culture. In the scalar future, 
change would depend on the rationalizing power of AI, whereas continuity would 
result from the alignment of human values and AI decisions. In the three cases, 
historical change would involve some form of nonhuman agency; at the same 
time, it would remain inscribed within the story of humanity. 
Whether they seek to preserve cryogenized bodies, to build a digital archive 
“as big as the earth” (to borrow Theodor H. Nelson’s phrase), or to ensure that 
future generations actually come into existence with a sense of what makes life 
worthwhile, most transhumanists are as concerned with the past as they are with 
the future.74 In transhumanist mailing lists and journals, special historical rubrics 
and calls to personal archives have expressed a sense of historicity, which trans-
humanists have understood as being manifested in the continuity of their own 
enterprise and that of individual identity through time. For this reason, posthuman 
futures have not altogether defied historical understanding. This fact has influ-
enced transhumanist practices: many transhumanists believe that knowledge pro-
duced “with an eye toward future users” (including those in the remote future)—
cryogenic and time capsules or digital archives, for instance—must be protected 
from future decay and from unprecedented technological breakthroughs.75 Yet 
many also believe that some form of identity and the conditions for making sense 
of the world will remain essentially the same. 
In transhumanism, visions of the truly other-than-human future usually stand 
in opposition to a desirable, more humane future in which the development of 
benevolent AI converges with forms of human enhancement or transforma-
tion. For instance, the roboticist Hans Moravec pointed out that conceiving of 
intelligent machines as humanity’s “mind children” required looking into “a 
future which, from our present vantage point, is best described by the words 
73. Bostrom, “Transhumanist Values,” 4-5, 9.
74. See, respectively, Michael Perry, “Suspension Failures: The Dark Side of Cryonics History,” 
Cryonics 13, no. 2 (1992), 5-8; Nelson, Computer Lib/Dream Machines, 141-48; Nick Bostrom, 
“Astronomical Waste: The Opportunity Cost of Delayed Technological Development,” Utilitas 15, 
no. 3 (2003), 308-14. 
75. On the relationship between archival practices and future users, see Lorraine Daston, “The 
Sciences of the Archive,” Osiris 27, no. 1 (2012), 160.
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‘postbiological’ or even ‘supernatural.’ It is a world in which the human race 
has been swept away by the tide of cultural change, usurped by its own artificial 
progeny.”76 At the same time, Moravec’s “transmigration” scenario offered a 
pathway to human survival in a future in which “protein-based” intelligent life-
forms would be disadvantaged.77 In this and less uncanny scenarios of posthuman 
future, the possibility of directing evolution or averting technological catastrophe 
is understood as taking part in a broader historical course—be it genealogical (as 
in the case of the Promethean future), evolutionary (as in the case of the spontane-
ous future), or accelerationist (as in the case of the scalar future). 
SECURING THE COSMIC FUTURE: FUTURE EXPERTISE FOR NONHUMAN EPOCHS
Most transhumanist thought and practice is predicated on anticipating some form 
of “cosmic future,” which requires departing from defining aspects of the human 
condition in its present form. In this sense, however, the posthuman can be com-
prehended from the point of view of a deep history of the universe. According 
to Ettinger, for instance, “if we take a sufficiently long view, [cryonics] is not 
so radical after all, but merely another incident in the cosmic drama.”78 The idea 
of a cosmic future is also a trope in popular science work on superintelligence, 
including in Moravec’s idea of mind children and more recent accounts of exis-
tential risk mitigation. In Bostrom’s oft-quoted words, the value of mitigating AI 
risk rests in “the attainment of a civilizational trajectory that leads to a compas-
sionate and jubilant use of humanity’s cosmic endowment,” an achievement that 
he believes would likely be realized by the development of a desirable form of 
superintelligence.79 
Stories of cosmic futures have their own histories.80 In the 1970s, when tech-
nologies such as the computer or the spaceship seemed to redefine humankind’s 
cosmological position, a rather common argument was that humanity’s role in 
the cosmic drama would change as a result of its new technological powers. This 
was evident in the success of “synthetic” histories about the origin, deep past, 
and deep future of the universe as well as in attempts to bridge the gap between 
human and natural histories. Literary critic Ihab Hassan, who has been credited 
with introducing the contemporary critical terms “postmodern” and “posthu-
man,” remarked in 1977 that humanity faced its “childhood’s end,” as the spe-
cies was awakening to its isolation in the silence of the cosmos.81 In this context, 
he proposed that a posthumanist culture would reconcile what C. P. Snow has 
76. Hans Moravec, Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human Intelligence (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 1.
77. Ibid., 108.
78. Ettinger, The Prospect of Immortality, 88.
79. Bostrom, Superintelligence, 260. See also Max Tegmark, Life 3.0: Being Human in the Age 
of Artificial Intelligence (New York: Knopf, 2017); Martin Rees, On the Future: Prospects for 
Humanity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018).
80. Nasser Zakariya, A Final Story: Science, Myth, and Beginnings (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2017).
81. Ihab Hassan, “Prometheus as Performer: Toward a Posthumanist Culture?” Georgia Review 
31, no. 4 (1977), 849. The term “childhood’s end” is taken from the science fiction novel Childhood’s 
End (1953) by Arthur C. Clarke.
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termed the “two cultures” of science and the humanities.82 Although such claims 
were hardly original, Hassan’s engagement with transhumanism is notable. As 
he argued, Esfandiary missed the posthuman call by focusing exclusively on the 
importance of science and technology.83
Indeed, not all transhumanists have seen the need for a new universal nar-
rative that would bridge humanist and scientific cultures. From transhumanist 
perspectives, history—as a specific realm of knowledge—does not make much 
sense. Most transhumanists, including Max More, have questioned the distinction 
between cultural and biological, or external and internal, change; to them, the 
term “nature” is largely devoid of meaning.84 Similarly, visions of self-replicating 
nanotechnology and self-improving machine intelligence are predicated on a 
broad conception of life that blurs the boundary between organic and mechani-
cal, social and physical. In this way, knowledge of the future can be acquired 
by investigating physical possibility. Transhumanists reject the pure distinctions 
between technology and humanity—and, relatedly, the notion that humanity and 
posthumanity should be approached as radically heterogeneous (after all, what 
we understand to be essentially human is only the product of our limited cogni-
tion). The very idea of a cosmic future brings to the fore the notion of nonhuman 
historical timescales and realms of comprehension, yet it also offers a way to use 
familiar terminology from physics, astrology, or evolutionary biology in order to 
make sense of radical change. In this respect, there is no need for a self-identical 
subject of transhumanist history. The posthuman story is that of life developing 
from primitive organisms to artificial minds—a process whose scale changes at 
the same time as the cognitive capacities of its protagonists. 
However, locating transhumanism with respect to the “two cultures” is more 
complicated precisely because transhumanists have generally rejected this divide. 
Transhumanists have not only contemplated humanity’s future destiny; they have 
also sought to bring it about by humanizing technology. In other words, they 
have made it so that even the most unfamiliar futures could be knowable. For 
Vinge, the notion of singularity encapsulated a difficulty shared by many science 
fiction writers: novels involving nonhuman perspectives and rapidly changing 
social and technological landscapes seemed condemned to irrelevance from their 
inception.85 Drexler endorsed “exploratory engineering,” a practical method for 
clarifying the limits of the scientifically possible, the technically achievable, and 
the socially desirable.86 As he insisted (in a Popperian vein), this method prom-
ised scientific knowledge of the future that avoided the pitfalls of prediction. 
Similarly, AI future scenarios can be seen as intellectual devices for managing 
the radical uncertainty of the future: risk scenarios delimit a “region of possible 
82. Ihab Hassan, “Beyond Arcadians & Technophiles: New Convergences in Culture?” 
Massachusetts Review 17, no. 1 (1976), 7. See also Ihab Hassan, “Toward a Transhumanized Earth: 
Imagination, Science, and Future,” Georgia Review 32, no. 4 (1978), 777-95.
83. Hassan, “Beyond Arcadians & Technophiles,” 9.
84. More, “The Extropian Principles 2.5.”
85. Vinge, “Hurtling towards the Singularity,” 117.
86. See, for instance, Drexler, Engines of Creation, 39-50; K. Eric Drexler, “Foresight Background 
No. 3, Rev. 1: Exploratory Engineering,” Foresight Institute (blog), 1988, https://foresight.org/
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futures,” wherein it is possible “to manipulate the future, steer it into a region 
palatable to humankind.”87 The challenge of existential risk, its advocates have 
argued, is to conceive rationally a future that one “cannot feel”; thus, resorting 
to stories is essential for conveying a sense of the potential loss that the failure 
to address these issues could entail.88 More than a transformation from utopian 
dreams of possibility into dystopian discussions of risk and uncertainty, the 
transhumanist future of existential risk constitutes a reconceptualization of the 
posthuman future, one that moves from an apparently unlimited future space to 
a set of limited possibilities that can be rationally assessed and ranked. In this 
respect, stories of the cosmic future provide compelling images of what aspects 
of current human existence are at risk of being irremediably lost.
LIBERAL FUTURESCAPES
I suggest that transhumanism is best understood as a set of future visions crafted 
within liberal languages.89 For transhumanists, the cosmic future is a valuable 
horizon, not because it sets final goals to humanity but because it opens a space 
for the realization of multiple forms of “transhuman transcendence.”90 In More’s 
terms, change toward posthumanity will be led by those who “anticipate our 
future as posthumans, and adjust their view of their lives accordingly.”91 This 
highlights, as Sheila Jasanoff has pointed out, that transhumanism conveys high-
modernist ambitions to turn human nature and societies into “liable” spaces open 
to intervention and rationalization, not through grand-scale social engineering 
but through a coordination of individual practices.92 In general, transhuman-
ist writers have portrayed decentralized forms of knowledge and technological 
practice as better suited to expressing the common good and enabling technosci-
entific innovation and coordination necessary for the development of some form 
of posthumanity. The Promethean future points to the self as the realm of free 
choice, safeguarded from outside coercion. In the spontaneous future, openness 
is primarily a condition for exercising property rights and enabling market effi-
ciency: unlimited resources would alleviate economic and ecological contraction 
87. Eliezer Yudkowsky, “Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk,” 
in Global Catastrophic Risks, ed. Nick Bostrom and Milan M. Ćirković (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 316.
88. Eliezer Yudkowsky, “Cognitive Biases Potentially Affecting Judgement of Global Risks,” in 
Bostrom and Ćirković, Global Catastrophic Risks, 115. 
89. This is not to say that posthuman futures necessarily articulate liberal political ideas but that 
transhumanism has emerged as a particular way of making sense of change in liberal discursive con-
texts. On liberal languages, see Michael Freeden, Liberal Languages: Ideological Imaginations and 
Twentieth-Century Progressive Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). I follow the 
comprehensive definition of liberalism proposed by Duncan Bell in “What Is Liberalism?” Political 
Theory 42, no. 6 (2014), 682-715.
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as well as the possibility of equilibrium between privately owned goods. The 
scalar future, by contrast, implies a long view from which technological risks 
and scenarios escape the realm of contestation. With enough time, any reasonable 
consensus could be achieved. Transhumanists turn the posthuman horizon into 
a manageable horizon, and they do so by claiming to ensure the “survival of life 
and liberty” in the long term.93 
Going back to Shklar’s idea of liberalism as a realist, yet hopeful and norma-
tive doctrine, it can be noted that transhumanists have insisted on describing 
their ideas as “realist” instead of utopian: they have claimed that theirs is “a phi-
losophy of Optimism based on an open-ended future” as well as individual pow-
ers of imagination and sense of purpose.94 In one of the few instances in which 
the posthuman future is referred to as a utopia, Bostrom insisted that “Utopia 
is not a location or a form of social organization” but rather “the hope that the 
scattered fragments of good that we come across from time to time in our lives 
can be put together, one day, to reveal the shape of a new kind of life.”95 The 
posthuman utopia Bostrom describes does not rely on any final visions or total-
izing ideals; more importantly, it “breaks no law of nature.”96 This means that 
although openness and plurality are core values of transhumanist discourse, they 
in fact coexist with the singularity of a horizon foreclosed by the laws of phys-
ics, before which political and social dynamics are set as mere epiphenomena. 
Finally, transhumanists have envisioned liberal futures of very different sorts. 
This is best summarized by contrasting some of its sharpest expressions. On the 
one hand, Ettinger claimed in the mid-1960s that “there is no such thing as the 
state, no such thing as posterity: there are only individual people, and the liv-
ing deserve as much consideration as the unborn.”97 No consideration of social 
justice or collective welfare should interfere with individual freedom, according 
to Ettinger. On the other hand, Bostrom argued in 2003 that a moral obligation 
to choose the best of futures derived from the potential “astronomical waste” of 
value for future generations that could be averted.98 In this sense, disjunctions 
between various forms of liberal posthuman futures seem hard to reconcile for 
ideological analysis. Instead, they manifest how visions of radically alien life 
can be articulated with a defense not only of libertarianism but also of global 
and intergenerational welfare.
Transhumanist futures unfold in a complicated zone in which different forms 
of liberal historicity coexist; indeed, some forms are deeply entrenched in mod-
ern historicity, but others are open to the emergence of the unprecedented. This 
is where a closer inspection of the context of postwar American and Western 
European liberalism is useful. The long postwar period has been described as a 
moment that saw the shrinkage not of all futures but of progressive imaginaries 
to the benefit of liberal ones. Following Jenny Andersson, I situate the origin 
93. Drexler, Engines of Creation, 172.
94. F. M. Esfandiary, Up-Wingers: A Futurist Manifesto (New York: John Day Company, 1973), 
14.
95. Nick Bostrom, “Letter from Utopia,” Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology 2, no. 1 (2008), 6.
96. Ibid.
97. Ettinger, The Prospect of Immortality, 173.
98. Bostrom, “Astronomical Waste.”
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of liberal and critical notions of many worlds and futures in the postwar period 
rather than in the aftermath of WWI or in the crises of the 1970s.99 In this view, 
the postwar period marked not the end of modern notions of history and future 
but the breaking up of the unity of progress and the remaking of forms of world 
unity and globality despite the fragmentation of common time. Visions of the 
posthuman future convey this notion that world change will occur through a 
change in the individual. As my exploration of transhumanism has suggested, 
subsequent remakings of humanity into one entity do not mean returning to the 
universalist ambitions of a modern, humanist type; instead, they introduce the 
fragmentation of liberal historicity into multiple conflicting temporal horizons. 
Finally, the various figures of the posthuman illustrate the pervasiveness of 
liberal normative repertoires throughout contemporary stories of unprecedented 
change. 
CONCLUSION
In this article, I analyzed three distinct conceptualizations of the posthu-
man future, each of which is anchored in a specific technological project: the 
Promethean future of cryonics, the spontaneous future of nanotechnology, and 
the scalar future of superintelligence. I highlighted how transhumanism involves 
conceptions of continuity and discontinuity but also more complex notions of 
universalism than its critics have tended to suggest. In particular, the universality 
of the posthuman future stems from the intangible character of the law of physics 
rather than from a common human nature. I also explained how transhumanists 
have anchored collective progress in projections of a future liberal world order 
that would depend not on representative or dialogical politics but on the aggrega-
tion of individual interests or values. Despite notable differences, they have gen-
erally understood their projects as focusing on opening time to a multiplicity of 
individual paths: the posthuman future would result from a particular conjunction 
of individual interests in a world that has vastly extended both in space and time.
This article has historicized the experience of discontinuous times. 
Transhumanists incorporate the challenge of nonhuman history by drawing con-
tinuity and disjointing time in different ways. In the material studied here, post-
human realization (individual or collective) occurs after—but not beyond—the 
confines of what has hitherto defined human history: physical decay, material 
scarcity, or irrationality. How transhumanists have understood the era of post-
humanity expresses at once the search for a figuration of radical otherness and 
the affirmation of a universal course, not through history but through physics 
and biology. As I argued in this article, the occurrence of unprecedented change 
toward posthumanity depends not only on social and intellectual dispositions 
that have to be cultivated in humans but also on the advent of a particular cosmic 
event (such as the rise of intelligent nonhuman life). At the same time, the plural-
ity of transhumanist futures manifests the wide-ranging appropriation of horizons 
of unprecedented change within postwar liberal normative repertoires.
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As Lorraine Daston has argued, current concerns for the nonhuman say much 
less about the nonhuman than they do about contemporary understandings of 
human knowledge and its limits.100 Transhumanist posthuman futures are strik-
ing in that they anticipate the unprecedented without necessarily invoking the 
Anthropocene event, though they discuss human historical responsibility toward 
the future and world system equilibrium. Nonetheless, they illustrate some of the 
very important challenges of nonhuman times. Indeed, because they manifest 
how ideas about radically alien life can coexist with a defense of existing modes 
of human existence, values, and power relations, transhumanist futures offer 
useful insights into the political possibilities and limits against which nonhuman 
futures can be deployed.
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